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Paul ricoeur claims in freedom and nature that delimiting the domain of habit is deeply 
challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is that we are asking 
about. habit, he says, is not like acting, sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, 
perceiving and so on. it has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that 
provides a form to our world relations. 
But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? in ordinary discourse, habits are often thought 
of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal and social identities. But they 
tend also to be thought of as actions in which the free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as 
automatic responses conditioned over time which are triggered by the environment such that we 
act ‘before we know what we are doing’.
In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the relationship between 
habitual action, reason and knowledge. i will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition 
in asking the question whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or 
whether they involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to 
expression as subject. in doing so, i will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative view of habit 
that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings of the matter before, (2) looking 
to phenomenological insights that offer a more positive view by integrating the notion of habit 
with discussions of embodiment and hermeneutic consciousness. here, i will refer to the work 
of merleau-Ponty and ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world. 
my claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in establishing the 
centrality of habit for identity formation, as husserl and merleau-Ponty do, but that they entail a 
unique form of knowing or exercise of reason which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative. 
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”To acquire a habit does not mean to repeat and consolidate but to invent, 
to progress.” 
Paul ricoeur
Paul ricoeur claims in freedom and nature that delimiting the domain of habit is 
deeply challenging, owing to the fact that we tend not to know exactly what it is 
that we are asking about (ricœur, 1966, p. 280). habit, he says, is not like acting, 
sensing or perceiving but is more akin to a way of sensing, perceiving and so on. it 
has to do with settled or dispositional ways of engaging the world that provides a 
form to our world relations. 
But what is the status of these ways of acting etc.? in ordinary discourse, habits 
are often thought of as good or bad and even as important to shaping our personal 
and social identities. But they tend also to be thought of as actions in which the 
free exercise of reason is deeply attenuated, as automatic responses conditioned 
over time which are triggered by the environment such that we act ‘before we 
know what we are doing’.
In what follows, I want to offer some reflections about the nature of the 
relationship between habitual action, reason and knowledge. This will not be 
comprehensive and seeks only to temper a certain one-sidedness in discussions of 
habit. i will draw mostly on the phenomenological tradition in asking the question 
whether habits denote performances in which thinking is absent or whether they 
involve a spontaneity in which the embodied and embedded subject comes to 
expression as subject. in doing so, i will (1) sketch an outline of the largely negative 
view of habit that tends to dominate specialized and ordinary understandings 
of the matter before, (2) looking to phenomenological insights that offer a more 
positive view by integrating the notion of habit with discussions of embodiment 
and hermeneutic consciousness. here, i will refer to the work of merleau-Ponty 
and ricoeur, for whom habit is an irreplaceable way of knowing the world. 
my claim is that these phenomenological resources are not only important in 
establishing the centrality of habit for identity formation, as husserl and merleau-
Ponty do, but that they entail a unique form of knowing or exercise of reason 
which is dynamic, attentive and imaginative. But first to the more negative 
appraisal.
in the Concept of mind, gilbert ryle makes explicit mention of habits but only to 
dismiss them as irrelevant to intelligent acting. ryle is concerned with offering 
an account of “knowing how” which is essentially distinct and irreducible to 
propositional “knowing that” inasmuch as it is enacted rather than enunciated. 
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But he is clear that “knowing how” is not to be identified in any way with the 
notion of habit. habits, along with explicit propositions, in fact, make up the two 
poles in whose tension the notion of dispositions is held. For ryle, the disposition 
is an engaged, mindful and dynamic way of knowing which is made manifest as 
responsive to the demands of a situation. This responsiveness requires revision 
of the classical cartesian account of knowledge because the intelligence involved 
in responsive dispositions does not involve something that we know but is rather 
an enacted intelligence. Still, such enacted knowing how is not to be identified with 
habituality.
while ryle is often described as a thinker with strong behaviorist sympathies, 
his account of dispositions must rather be understood as an explicit attempt 
to distance himself from behaviorism inasmuch as he thinks of dispositions as 
incorporated ways of knowing the world which are not automatic. on the other 
hand, behaviorist claims seem to very much determine the way he thinks about 
habits. To act from habit, he says, is “to act automatically and without mind to 
what one is doing” (ryle, 2000, p. 42). Following a famous cue from aristotle, 
ryle describes habits as ‘second natures’ but goes on to say that these second 
natures consist of drill and the rote learning of basic skills or facts which can 
be reproduced or recited without significant use of intelligence. When a child 
learns to recite the multiplication tables, she does so in a way that lacks any 
meaningful mental engagement. She merely repeats the words in the way a 
parrot might. So while dispositions involve a non-propositional application 
of intelligence that is dynamic, adaptive and progressive, habits are blind and 
thoughtless and are incorporated into actions as reflexes. He claims that while 
“drill dispenses with intelligence, training develops it” (ryle, 2000, p. 42). a habit, 
then, is a stock response, lacking in dynamism, which is always the same, and 
which issues forth in answer to a specific stimulus. A habit might, of course, 
appear to be intelligent (the multiplication tables are the manifestation of an 
intelligence) while a disposition might appear to be a reflex (as when the chess 
player makes a spontaneous move without appearing to deliberate) but we must 
not let ourselves be deceived. what separates the habit from the disposition is (a) 
the extent to which the agent appropriates the knowledge as her knowledge and, 
(b) the capacity to engage with the world on the basis of this knowledge in a way 
that is innovative. acting from habit denotes, for ryle, a type of performance that 
is static because its meaning in wider contexts of significance remains largely 
opaque for us. as such, habitual action cannot be considered to manifest knowing 
in any genuine sense.
This view of habit is typical of the way it has come to be thought by philosophers 
and in ordinary discourse. even one of the great thinkers of the formation of 
subjectivity in habituality, heidegger, tends to present habit in a largely negative 
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light.  Take, for example, the social expression of habit in heidegger’s discussion 
of dasein’s public everydayness (heidegger, 1962, p. 213). ordinary everydayness is 
presented, by heidegger, as incorporating and reproducing ways of being, talking 
and thinking about the world, oneself and others which are intelligible in a sense 
but which cannot be considered to manifest genuine knowing. For ryle, learning 
the multiplication tables also contained a certain intelligibility in the sense that 
the tables themselves are the product of intelligent organizations. when i repeat 
them, however, i am not doing so intelligently but spontaneously and without 
thought. likewise, for heidegger, the idle talk (gerede) of the ‘they’ (das man) is 
not lacking in intelligibility and he even concedes that it is a way of disclosing 
the world. and yet the dasein which discloses in such talk does so in a mode of 
“groundless floating” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 221) which “not only releases one from 
the task of genuinely understanding, but develops an undifferentiated kind of 
intelligibility, for which nothing is closed off any longer” (heidegger, 1962, p. 213). 
habitual ways of being and acting, as such, distract, uproot and alienate dasein 
from Being-in-the-world by dissolving individual dasein into an inauthentic 
self-forgetfulness or an amorphous ‘they’ that is everyone and no-one. This 
contrasts with authentic self-appropriation which is made possible on the basis 
of radically disclosive experiences that reveal the singularity of dasein, not apart 
from the world but in the network of world and other relations.1 So for both ryle 
and heidegger, the problem is not so much that habitualities lack intelligence but 
that the intelligence is not genuinely expressive of the habitual agent. whether 
this lack is the lack of enacted rational agency (ryle) or of an authentic self-
relation (heidegger), the point is that they involve ways of being, thinking and 
acting which are incorporated in me but which are not really mine. heidegger is 
concerned here with habitual ways of making sense which are, to be sure, much 
more complex than what ryle has in mind with the concept of habit but what both 
discussions have in common is the presentation of incorporated ways of acting 
as lacking in understanding or dynamism, as stock and as falling away from a 
genuinely intelligent engagement with oneself and the world.
what these accounts have in common is a commitment to the idea that authentic 
world engagement must revolve around an immediate kind of self-transparency. 
The problem with habits is that they inhibit transparency through the 
incorporation of ways of being and acting that are, from the start, thoughtless or 
1  There are other places in heidegger’s text which could fruitfully be discussed with regard to our 
theme. not least of which is his analysis of the primordiality of dasein’s practical engagement with the world. 
As is well known, Heidegger provides detailed analysis of the way in which the world is first and foremost 
encountered as a network of significances which are ready-to-hand (zuhanden). These are eminently relevant 
because of the fact that it argues for a world relation that is shot through with habituality. For heidegger, 
habit is essential to any understanding of human Being-in-the-world. however, my claim here is simply the 
minimal one that the overriding concern for authenticity in Being and Time results in a clear ambivalence 
regarding habits in that they are viewed as both essential and problematic.
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which have become so.
But must habit be so understood? i want now to turn to certain texts of 
merleau-Ponty and ricoeur who challenge this view by claiming that habits 
are, in fact, crucial to the constitution of the individual as individual and to 
her constitution as knower of the world.2
Their claims will turn out to hang on the importance of embodiment and 
hermeneutic consciousness for our understanding of what subjectivity 
is. The idea is that subjectivity does not simply stand in opposition to 
objectivity but naturalizes or objectifies itself through its Being-in-the-
world. This is important for the concept of habit because it enables us to 
think the objectification process, which partly determines habit acquisition, 
not as a loss of genuine engagement with the world as subject but as a crucial 
moment of this coming to expression. at the same time, they are aware that 
this objectification can reify and become automatism. They simply reject 
the claim that such degeneration of habit should be identified with habit 
simplicter (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 145).
as is well known, merleau-Ponty makes embodiment fundamental to any 
genuine understanding of the meaning of subjectivity, a commitment which 
entails thinking of the habitual body not as a ‘falling away’ of consciousness 
but a crucial moment in its coming to presence.  as such, the formation 
of habit is considered to be important to the way in which consciousness 
spiritualizes the world and is naturalized by it such that it becomes important 
to the constitution of authentic Being-in-the-world. habit acquisition is a 
crucial moment in the dialectic between spirit and nature which, in turn, 
is of crucial importance for the singularization of the subject as knower. as 
such, habits are intensely individualizing and cannot be considered to stand 
for a flight away from myself. In many ways, Merleau-Ponty’s habits are close 
enough to ryle’s dispositions even though their import encompasses both 
considerations of epistemology and also the constitution of personhood and 
identity.
But is it just a question of terminology that separates ryle and merleau-Ponty? 
2  merleau-Ponty is not alone in his positive evaluation of habit and habituality. as dermot 
moran has recently pointed out, husserl’s writings are replete with detailed and comprehensive 
analyses of habits and their crucial role in the constitution of human life at corporeal, social 
and cultural levels (moran, 2011, p. 61). These analyses are so important for husserl’s account 
of rational personhood that they make the various cartesian caricatures of the founder of 
phenomenology untenable (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 82). i will not be discussing husserl in the present 
context for two reasons. The first is that his coverage of habituality is simply too comprehensive 
to be done justice to here. The second reason is that our theme is especially about knowing and 
while this is not alien to husserl’s discussions of habit, he tends mainly to prioritize the role of 
habit in the constitution of the person. 
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is the latter is simply calling habit what the former called disposition? it might 
appear so given that merleau-Ponty also discusses thoughtless, automatic 
actions which he distinguishes from habits such that it might seem that his 
habits are identical Ryle’s dispositions. And yet, the significance of the explicit 
connection between habituality and embodiment should not be overlooked 
here. in making this connection, merleau-Ponty appears to incorporate a 
naturalistic perspective into his account of knowing in the sense that there 
is a respiration between the emergence out of and the sinking into nature in 
the embodied subject’s business of knowing the world. For ryle, by contrast, 
the concept of disposition was explicitly intended to protect the concept of 
intelligence against its degeneration into natural being through habit. 
For merleau-Ponty, corporeal habits are about “the reworking and renewal 
of the corporeal schema” (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 143) and have to do with 
the way the body knows the world and is transformed by it (merleau-Ponty, 
2012, p. 143f.). in a similar vein, ricoeur says that habit, “is a new structuring 
in which the meaning of elements changes radically” (ricœur, 1966, pp. 
287-288). Speaking at the level of bodily habit, he follows merleau-Ponty in 
thinking of habit as the adaptation of the body to the meaning of the world, 
the incorporation of that meaning and a new gestalting of the environment 
through bodily engagement. again, we see the complex dialectic, which is 
better described as an interweaving of body and environment, or the body’s 
institution in the text of the world.
This understanding of the meaning of bodily habits is therefore explicitly 
intended to challenge the way that we think about consciousness and mind. it 
prompts us to rethink what we understand by the notion of ‘understanding’ 
(merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 146)  precisely because the body knows the world, in 
habit, in a way that is adaptive and dynamic without being self-consciously 
deliberative (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 145). as he did throughout his career, 
merleau-Ponty is here trying to think together that which has traditionally 
been thought apart; namely consciousness and nature (merleau-Ponty, 
1983, p. 2). as such, he insists that we err in our attempt to makes sense of 
the constitution of meaning if we do not approach the problem in terms of 
a deep interwovenness of body and mind.3 while ryle might be inclined to 
agree with parts of Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning here, the former reflects little 
on the explicit meaning of embodiment for knowing how such that the role 
3  it was no doubt for this reason that merelau-Ponty’s later writings show a distrust of even 
the concept of constitution which he (somewhat unfairly to husserl) thinks of as a one-way street 
of ‘meaning giving’ Sinngebung. as an alternative, he uses the notion of institution which seems 
to capture what was essential to husserlian constitution while simultaneously acknowledging 
the way in which the conscious subject is given over to itself in and by nature. See, for example, 
his lectures on instituion and Passivity (merleau-Ponty, 2010)
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of embodiment remains somewhat under-communicated.4 it is possible that 
the largely unthought role of the body accounts for ryle’s wariness of the 
notion of habit and his dismissal of settled dispositions as thoughtless. For 
merleau-Ponty, habits, especially as corporeal, are crucial to the reception 
and generation of meaning. he claims that “the body has understood and the 
habit has been acquired when the body allows itself to be penetrated by a new 
signification, when it has assimilated a new meaningful core.” (Merleau-Ponty, 
2012, p. 148) 
in other words, to be an ego is to be an habitual ego, an ego of capacities. 
This does not mean that the habitual ego is an entirely predictable ego 
that mindlessly repeats patterns of thought and action without invention. 
Quite the contrary. habits constitute us as having a certain style and are 
the horizon of our capacity to know the world and to personalize this 
knowing. But this is a moving, dynamic horizon. habits are not mechanisms 
but tendencies or dispositions within which imagination, creativity and 
spontaneity come to expression. 
habit as a capacity for discovery is, as such, utterly belied when it is described 
in terms of automatism (ricœur, 1966, p. 284). habits can degenerate into 
automatism but they are not predominantly this. This point was clearly at 
stake in merleau-Ponty’s famous and oft cited example of the football player’s 
perception of the playing area:
For the player in action the football field is not an ‘object’, that is, the ideal 
term which can give rise to a multiplicity of perspectival views and remain 
equivalent under its apparent transformations. it is pervaded with lines 
of force (the ‘yard lines’; those which demarcate the penalty area) and 
articulated in sectors (for example, the ‘openings’ between the adversaries) 
which call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action 
as if the player were unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, but 
present as the immanent term of his practical intentions. (merleau-Ponty, 
1983, p. 168)
This example is usually cited in order to demonstrate the claim that the 
environment is not primarily encountered as a system of objects, shapes 
and figures which are to be understood before being engaged.5 This is an 
important point to be sure. what is often overlooked, however, are the 
implications of this example for the way we think about thinking and 
4  This in spite of the fact that ryle often uses examples of embodied dispositions that would 
seem to be perfectly compatible with merleau-Pontyian accounts. he would, however, certainly 
have been skeptical to the claim that the body can be said to “know more than we do about the 
world” (merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 248)
5  This kind of interpretation is typical of dreyfus’ reading of merleau-Ponty and is also 
consistent with environmental accounts of mind found in writers such as James gibson (gibson, 
1979) and Jacob von Uexküll (von Uexküll, 2010).
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knowing. hubert dreyfus, for example, has given birth to a certain orthodox 
reading of merleau-Ponty on this point that maintains that because the 
football player is not thinking propositionally about the football pitch or 
about his body’s movement in it, that he is not present to himself as thinking 
at all (dreyfus, 2007, p. 356). This goes too far and betrays the point that 
Merleau-Ponty is trying to make. When the football player engages the field 
as lines of force, he is specifically engaged in a practical species of thinking 
that engages the field as a field of possible actions. The game has rules which 
mean that the lines and spaces have a certain meaning within that context. 
however, these demarcations do not impel action but invite it and they invite 
it by opening for a range of possible engagements. The football player’s habit 
gives rise to a “probing”, as ricoeur puts it (ricœur, 1966, p. 290), which co-
creates the meaning of the space in the dialectic of transforming and being 
transformed. it is therefore not so much that action is ‘drawn out’ of the 
agent, but that the agent meets a field of possible action which can be engaged 
imaginatively only because he is thinking.
it is possible that dreyfus means this too but his focus in these discussions has 
always tended to be in the wrong place.6 he follows merleau-Ponty in arguing 
correctly that “movement is not thought about movement” (merleau-Ponty, 
2012, p. 139) but would do well to note ricoeur’s insistence that while i do not 
think the movement, i make knowing use of it such that “we need not say 
that in habit consciousness is abolished but only that reflexive knowing and 
willing are” (ricœur, 1966, p. 286). in other words, the creative, spontaneous 
nature of world engagement in habit is one that justifies thinking of habit as 
comprising a kind of mindful, practical imagination. The fact that this is not 
thinking under the species of conceptual, propositional thinking does not 
mean that it is not thinking at all.7 That the football player does not think 
about the rectangularity of the football pitch or the bio-mechancics of his 
own movement as he plays is true but focusing only on this question leaves 
the meat of the account of habit untouched.  it tells us what habitual action 
is not (explicit thinking) but not what it is. while there is more that could be 
said here, it suffices to say that Merleau-Ponty considers habits to be crucial 
to the individuation of consciousness and to the life of discovery. habits are 
not automatisms that hinder genuine understanding. They denote, rather, 
the way in which my life is constituted in experience through my own actions 
6  on this, see my critique of dreyfus’ reading of merleau-Ponty (mcguirk, 2013).
7  Precisely this point of the status of practical coping vis-à-vis the conceptual was discussed 
in great detail in the 2007 debate between hubert dreyfus (dreyfus, 2007a, 2007b) and John 
mcdowell (J. mcdowell, 2007; John mcdowell, 2007). my point here goes in another direction 
inasmuch as i am claiming that habitual action is neither a conceptual form of knowing 
(mcdowell) nor an opaque form of coping (dreyfus).
PHENOMENOlOgICAl CONSIDERATIONS Of HABIT
JameS mcgUirK  university of nordland
155
and the actions of others and the world upon me. The dialectic is what gives 
the ego to itself as this individual even while we must always remain wary of 
sedimentations that will dissolve individuality. The traces that the past (both 
personal and historical), others and nature leave upon us do not close the 
future as a future of sameness but enable our capacity to meet the future as a 
new field of possibilities. 
But habit is not just a feature of our bodily being-in-the-world. it is also 
crucially determinative of the socially engaged subject, as we have seen 
already with heidegger. while this dimension of habit is rarely broached by 
merleau-Ponty, it is central in ricoeur’s treatment of the matter in freedom 
and nature. 
ricoeur takes his cue here from merleau-Ponty, but also from Felix 
ravaisson, whose little book On habit (ravaisson, 2008), with its 
modernization of the aristotelian notion of habit as ‘second nature’, is 
frequently cited. To be sure, Ravaisson’s reflections on the relationship 
between freedom and nature are interpreted through the lens of 
merleau-Ponty but in a way that allows ricoeur to draw certain unspoken 
conclusions out of the work of the latter. That merleau-Ponty himself 
did not take the discussion in these directions is no critique since it is 
beyond the ambit of what he is trying to do in Phenomenology of Perception. 
That is, while merleau-Ponty’s exploration considers the dialectic between 
naturalized consciousness and spiritualized nature in order to challenge basic 
assumptions about epistemology, anthropology and ontology, ricoeur brings 
these to bear in a more comprehensive evaluation of habit as such. Thus, his 
approach is thoroughly phenomenological and merleau-Pontyian8 while it 
tries to match the sweep of ravaisson’s discussion. in other words, ricoeur’s 
discussion is anchored in a more comprehensive discourse about being-in-the-
world in which he presents a non-heideggerian response to a heideggerian 
problem, at least as far as the question of habit goes.
in this text, ricoeur claims that the way habits shape perception and 
physical competences is analogous to the way in which fore-knowledge 
both opens new fields of possibilities and comes to expression in new and 
surprising ways. For ricoeur:
what i know intellectually is present to me in the same way as the bodily 
skills i have. what i learn, what is understood in an original act of thought, 
is constantly being left behind as an act and becomes a sort of body of my 
8  ricoeur never cites merleau-Ponty in freedom and nature, although he once claimed 
that his debt to merleau-Ponty was enormous and that the latter had shaped his thought in 
immeasurable ways. he said of merleau-Ponty’s thought, that: “il est passé dans mon sang et dans 
mes veins” (ricoeur, 1983). i am indebted to Bengt Kristensson Uggla for this reference.
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thought: thus knowledge becomes integrated with the realm of capabilities 
which i use without articulating them anew (ricœur, 1966, p. 294).
in this way, he extends the scope of the merleau-Pontyian discussion in a 
way that would challenge not only ryle, but also heidegger, inasmuch as it 
suggests another way of appraising habitual ways of thinking and acting. 
crucial to this alternative picture is the idea that habituality is adaptive. 
“There is a wisdom of habit,” ricoeur says, “which psychology does not 
encounter as long as it restricts itself to stereotyped forms of conduct” 
(ricœur, 1966, p. 290).
What is learned – at first explicitly – becomes incorporated into the agent’s 
range of possibilities. For ricoeur, this is important as a way of describing 
the nature of our knowing relation with the world. The habit comprises, 
on the one hand, a kind of cognitive short-cut in the sense that what was 
first appropriated or learned explicitly need not be rehearsed every time it 
is called upon.9 But it gradually transforms our encounter with the world 
and generates capacities that make possible a new ease of engaging and 
knowing.  
This claim is explicitly rooted in his understanding of the nature of 
subjectivity and the meaning of the first-person perspective as it is used 
in phenomenological research. In one of the finest presentations of the 
paradox of this perspective, ricoeur explains habituation as a slipping away 
from itself of the subject where the incorporation of the business of thinking 
makes it partially opaque at the level of explicit consciousness and opens for 
the spontaneity of the subject to be a surprise to itself. he says that:
The strange presence within me of my intellectual experience…laid down by 
the activity of thought itself…seems to objectify thought completely. and yet 
the paradox which seems ruinous for a philosophy of the subject receives full 
significance only for it, for what is presented as an enigma is my self becoming 
a nature by virtue of time; an “it thinks” is present in the “i think” (ricœur, 
1966, p. 294)
This was very much the point in merleau-Ponty’s example of the football 
player’s engagement with the field of play in the sense that at stake was a 
decentring of the thinking agent in a way that is yet not self-forgetful or 
alienating. a version of this point is also found in ravaisson, who claims 
that,
in descending gradually from the clearest regions of consciousness, habit 
carries with it light from those regions into the depths and dark night of 
nature. habit is an acquired nature, a second nature that has its ultimate 
9  ravaisson addresses the same point when he notes that the effort of consciousness is 
effaced over time (ravaisson, 2008, p. 59)
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ground in primitive nature, but which alone explains the latter to the 
understanding. It is, finally, a natured nature, the product and successive 
revelation of naturing nature (ravaisson, 2008, p. 59).
leaving aside the somewhat unfortunate language of the ‘dark night’ of 
‘primitive nature’, the point to note concerns an othering of consciousness 
into nature in which self-presence becomes partially opaque. i become a 
mystery to myself because of the forces – both natural and cultural – which 
shape me as well as the way in which my own experience – corporeal and 
intellectual – becomes embodied such that they come to expression in ways 
that are not always entirely transparent for me. in this sense, the insights 
about the nature of constitution which were offered by merleau-Ponty’s 
account of embodied subjectivity are carried over into other forms of the 
contextual embeddedness of the subject.
This insight would be determinative for ricoeur’s later hermeneutic work 
too, of course, in that it pre-figures the thought, central for hermeneutics, 
that the constitution of the subject comprises both an origination in the 
time before the subject and also a slipping away in the time of the subject 
(ricœur, 1984, 1992).10 But these opacities of the self to itself are crucially not 
consigned to either the domain of the sub-personal or the inauthentic. They 
are instead considered forms of self-othering that operate within the realm 
of the humanizing of the self as singular knower.
ricoeur’s (and raviasson’s) positive appraisals of the trajectory of mind in 
habit are important though for validating forms of knowing which lack 
thorough transparency. and in saying this, the point is not that habitual 
action is blind but rather that it operates out of a ground which may have 
receded from view. rather than making the habitual action blind, the claim 
is that the ground that has been formed by habit is the basis for seeing, 
comprehending and acting. For merleau-Ponty, ricoeur and ravaisson, the 
point is that this humanizing process takes place in a way that is embodied 
and embedded even to the extent that singularity is constituted in a tension 
between full transparency and blind opacity regarding the sources of 
meaningful action.
The difference between this view of habit and that of ryle (or heidegger) 
hangs, then, on the connection of habit to the phenomenology of the body 
and to hermeneutics (for ricoeur it is both). For neither merleau-Ponty nor 
ricoeur deny that habit involves a certain opacity of the self to itself. They 
are clear that habitual action involves an aspect of the self slipping out of 
10  ricoeur is, throughout his writings interested in the interplay between the involuntary and 
the voluntary, whether this concern the possibility of novelty in action, as in the fourth study 
of Oneself as another (ricœur, 1992, pp. 88-112) or in language, as in the third study in The rule of 
metaphor (ricœur, 2003, pp. 74-116).
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view for itself. whether as embodied or historical subject, our being-in-
the-world comprises habitualities of mental, social, cultural and physical 
action, whose originally transparent connection with the will have receded. 
however, rather than considering such habituality and its attendant opacity 
as an affront to genuine personhood or to the meaning of human knowing, 
they suggest that our knowing and being are crucially expressed through 
these forms.
nowhere is this clearer than in ricoeur’s treatment of the problem 
of automatism that was so crucial to ryle’s and heidegger’s negative 
appraisals of habit. in his discussion of the dialectic between “spontaneity 
and automatism in habit”, ricoeur is able to fully confront the rylean/
heideggerian prejudice on the basis of merleau-Pontyian insights in a way 
that merleau-Ponty himself did not do. as noted earlier, this is largely 
because Phenomenology of Perception is essentially a discussion of perception 
and mind that incorporates considerations of habit while ricoeur’s 
text is a more fully developed phenomenology of habit that builds upon 
considerations of perception and mind.  
when ricoeur takes up the point, he is able to give ryle and heidegger their 
due by acknowledging the phenomena they point to while simultaneously 
challenging their interpretation of the meaning of these. Thus, he offers 
a more nuanced account of habit which is neither wholly positive nor 
negative. For ricoeur, habit is always in danger of slipping into automatism. 
whether on the basis of aging or a lack of attention, habits can become 
predominantly expressions of association, repetition and fixation. There is 
a tendency towards inertia that is inescapable in human life, which tempts 
us to “resign our freedom under the inauthentic form of custom, of the 
‘they’, of the ‘only natural’, of the already seen and already done” (ricœur, 
1966, p. 301). This coheres with ordinary intuitions about habit and both 
ryle and heidegger are right to capture this aspect of the matter. however, 
Ricoeur insists that while “ossification is a threat inscribed in habit, [it is] 
not its normal destiny” (ricœur, 1966, p. 302). To act habitually is not to 
act automatically, programmatically or ‘without thinking’. This is, rather, 
a disintegration of habit into the associative such that “the mechanical 
represents a triumph of automatism over the will” (ricœur, 1966, p. 304). 
ordinarily, though, habitualities are incorporated skills and knowledge that 
enable us to engage dynamically with the world in ways that are seemingly 
effortless. This goes from basic operations such as reaching for a doorknob 
to comforting an upset student. These actions can become automatisms if 
we fail to attend to what we are doing and will cause us to err. as ricoeur 
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notes, mistakes only occur on the condition that we lose focus on the task 
at hand, while “a will attentive to the task is stronger than any association” 
(ricœur, 1966, p. 305). Thus understood, “the mechanical which seems 
to invade certain consciousness to the very roots is never completely 
independent of a definite desertion of consciousness” (ricœur, 1966, p. 306).
The complexity of habit is such that it can fall into unconscious action 
or give us over to sedimented ways of responding that barely engage 
with the situation in which we find ourselves. But his point is that this is 
fundamentally a degeneration of the habitual and not its essence. Following 
merleau-Ponty, ricoeur thinks of habit as “the useful naturalization of 
consciousness” (ricœur, 1966, p. 307), and the ‘descent’ of freedom into 
nature. This complex interweaving is the site of human being-in-the-world. 
We exist in the tension that can tend towards an excessive form of reflection 
that seeks to make us entirely self-transparent and a sleep of reason that 
allows consciousness to become ossified and objectified but both of these are 
here understood as distortions of the authentically habitual.
The importance of ricoeur’s account here is that he manages to develop 
merleau-Pontyian insights into the nature of habit which take seriously our 
ordinary intuitions about habit – as expounded in the discussions of ryle 
and heidegger – but which place these intuitions in a more comprehensive 
framework which is derived from the most systematic analysis of habit to be 
found in the phenomenological tradition.11
11  i would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments which have 
made this a better paper.
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